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Abstract
Interpersonal ties are pivotal to individual efficacy, status and performance in
an agent society. This paper explores three important and interrelated themes in
social network theory: the center/periphery partition of the network; network dy-
namics; and social integration of newcomers. We tackle the question: How would
a newcomer harness information brokerage to integrate into a dynamic network
going from periphery to center? We model integration as the interplay between
the newcomer and the dynamics network and capture information brokerage us-
ing a process of relationship building. We analyze theoretical guarantees for the
newcomer to reach the center through tactics; proving that a winning tactic al-
ways exists for certain types of network dynamics. We then propose three tactics
and show their superior performance over alternative methods on four real-world
datasets and four network models. In general, our tactics place the newcomer to the
center by adding very few new edges on dynamic networks with ≈ 14000 nodes.
1 Introduction
An agent society (or system) is defined by patterns of dyadic links between individuals.
Research on social networks has greatly advanced our understanding of how traits such
as ties, modules, and flow, impact agents’ positions [4]. Gaining a central position is
seen as beneficial thanks to the relative easiness it brings to receive diverse information
and exercise influence over other agents, i.e., a central position defines an information
broker who accesses and integrates information through social links. This notion has
wide implications on roles, status and leadership in organizations [20] and has recently
facilitated applications such as IoT [10] and semantic web [13].
A predominant meso-scale feature of many complex networks is the emergence of
tiers: Sitting at the center is a densely-connected cohesive core, and on the outskirts a
loosely-knit periphery. This paper asks the question: How would a newcomer harness
information brokerage to integrate into a dynamic network going from the periphery
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to the center? Two assumptions are made: (a) We focus on networks that have a dis-
tinguished center, e.g., a core/periphery structure; and (b) We examine the decisions
and processes of relationships building. The aim is to approach the question through a
formal, algorithmic lens. This demands settling two issues: (1) The first concerns rep-
resentations of center and brokerage. We stay consistent with the framework defined in
[21] and treats information brokers as agents that give the newcomer low eccentricity,
hence getting into the (Jordan) center of the network [26]. (2) The second is about
network dynamics. As the network evolves with time, the model must make sense
for dynamic networks. This sets this work apart from previous works on information
brokerage where only static networks are of concern and brings extra complications
to the problem. Even though we phrase the problem assuming additive changes to the
network (as, e.g., a citation network), our notions and techniques also apply to fully
dynamic networks.
Contribution. (1) We formulate integration as repeated, parallel interplays between a
newcomer and the ensemble of other agents in the network it aims to join. The network
evolves in the form of a sequence of snapshots in discrete time, which is determined by
the initial network, the network’s own evolution trace, and the newcomer’s strategy for
adding ties. The goal of the newcomer is to adopt a tactic that moves it from periphery
to center within a finite number of steps regardless of dynamic changes of the network.
(2) We study the existence of such strategies under certain reasonable conditions. In
particular, when the center is bounded – as in many networks with a center/periphery
structure – the newcomer has a winning tactic. (3) We propose three simple tactics and
compare them with two methods from [21] which are designed for the same problem on
static networks. Our tactics outperform the alternatives over four real-world dynamic
networks.We also propose four dynamic network models with varying core/periphery-
ness: dynamic preferential attachment, Jackson-Rogers, rich-club and onion models,
and analyze the performance of tactics over them. Our tactics bring the newcomer to
the center by creating less than 10 new edges in all of the experiments performed.
Related work. We focus on the individual strategies on networks with dynamic core
periphery structure, which related to three categories: core-periphery structure, net-
work building problem. Game-theoretical research on network formation focuses on
equilibria among rational agents [14, 6]; in contrast, our paper complements this body
of work by investigating optimal tactics for a single agent in a dynamic setting. Mo-
tivated from [25], [21] initiates the static version of the problem under investigation,
namely, building the least amount of edges to bring a newcomer to the network center.
We build on their work and study dynamic networks. As opposed to the static case, a
desired tactic may not exist under certain forms of network dynamics.
The definition of a graph center goes back to the work of Jordan in the 19th century
and eccentricity belongs to a family of distance-based centrality indices [3]. Despite
its simplicity, eccentricity has been useful in many places, e.g. from analyzing islands
networks [?] and the rise of the Medici family in marriage alliance network [22] to
mapping Hollywood actors/actresses [11]. Although the center can be identified for
any network, we specifically target at core/periphery structures [2]. Observations of
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such tiered structures root in economics where the world is divided between industrial,
“core” nations and agricultural, “peripheral” nations [?, 17]. Similar structures are
subsequently witnessed in, e.g., social networks [7], scientific citation [?], and trading
networks [9]. Agents in the core, being hubs, enjoy many benefits such as control over
information and domination of resources. A crucial feature of the core, apart from its
central position and density, is the stability over time [8, 24].
2 Network Building in a Dynamic Network
A social network is an undirected graph G=(V,E); V is a set of vertices (or agents),
an edge {u, v} ∈ E, denoted by uv, represents links between agents u, v. The dis-
tance distG(v, u) is the shortest length of any path between v and u; for S ⊆ V ,
set distG(v, S) = minu∈S(distG(v, u)). The eccentricity of v ∈ V is eccG(v) =
maxu∈V distG(u, v). The radius and diameter ofG are, resp., rad(G)=mini∈V ecc(i)
and diam(G) = maxi∈V ecc(i) [11]. The center of G is the set C(G) = {v ∈ V |
ecc(v) = rad(G)}.
A dynamic network evolves in discrete-time, i.e., it consists of a (potentially infi-
nite) list of networks G=G0, G1, G2, . . . where Gi=(Vi, Ei) is the network instance
at timestamp i ≥ 0. We define the set of vertices of a dynamic network G as the set
VG = ∪i∈NVi. As G may contain infinitely many timestamps, VG may be infinite. For
any v ∈ VG, the set of neighbors EG(v) is {u ∈ VG | vu ∈ Ei, i ∈ N}. As individuals
usually have an only bounded capacity to manage social links, we require that EG(v)
being finite for all v. Thus the graph (VG,∪i∈NEi) stays a locally-finite graph.
Two caveats exist: Firstly, we should clarify what forms of structural changes may
happen. In principle, any addition/removal of vertices/edges may occur. For the major-
ity of this paper, however, we focus on a simpler form of dynamics where the network
only makes additive changes,i.e., the only allowable updates are the addition of ver-
tices/edges. Secondly, we need a policy regarding the frequency of timestamps. One
natural method is to separate consecutive instances with a fixed period, e.g., instances
of a social network may be generated by day. Another common approach is to add
a timestamp only when an update occurs, e.g., a timestamp may correspond to when
certain update happens between two individuals causing a new edge to form. The exact
meaning of a timestamp should be up to the actual application scenario.
We study the process that expands a network with new edges. Imagine an outside
agent who aims to integrate into the network and explore information within. Infor-
mation brokers refer to a set of appropriately located vertices who collectively give
the newcomer good access to the information within the network. More formally, for
G = (V,E), H = (U,F ) (V,U may or may not overlap), G⊕H denotes the network
(V ∪ U,E ∪ F ). Throughout, we use u to denote a newcomer. For any subset S ⊆ V ,
define S ⊗ u as (S ∪ u, {vu | v ∈ S}). Thus G ⊕ (S ⊗ u) is the resulting network
obtained after integrating u into G via building links between u and every vertex in S.
The following definition is proposed by [21].
Definition 1. A broker set for G is B ⊆ V such that eccG⊕(B⊗u)(u)= rad(G⊕ (B ⊗
u)).
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The intuition behind the definition is that by making contacts with members of a
broker set, u can gain maximum access to the network. As a broker set always exists
for a graphG, the question then focuses on the size of broker sets. The minimum broker
set problem asks for a broker set B ⊆ V with the smallest cardinality and is shown to
be NP-complete [21].
The main goal of this paper is to extend the above notions to a dynamic setting,
capturing the process in which a newcomer builds ties with an evolving network to
gain maximal access of information in the network. Note that connecting to brokers
embodies a dynamic process: As building relations requires effort and time, a broker
set B is built iteratively where edges are added for u one by one, until its eccentricity
becomes rad(G⊕(B⊗u)). Over a dynamic networkG, uwould act while the network
evolves [28]. From u’s perspective, its position relies not only on its own actions but
also on the ensemble of all other agents in the network. At any timestamp, both parties
make moves simultaneously, affecting the next network instance. Agent u’s move
consists of building new edges to the current graph; the others party’s move consists
of updates of the form “adding a new edge (either between two existing nodes, or a
new vertex and an existing node)”. Formally, for any network G, an expansion of G is
a network F whose every connected component contains at least one node in G, i.e.,
G⊕ F is a network achieved by the two types of updates.
Definition 2. Fix an initial network G0 = (V0, E0) and a newcomer u /∈ V0. For
k, ` ∈ N, an integration process (IP) is a dynamic network I = G0, G1, G2, . . . where
∀i ≥ 0
Gi+1 = Gi ⊕ (Fi ⊕ (Si ⊗ u))
where Si is a set of vertices in Gi that are not adjacent to u, and Fi is an expansion of
Gi that does not contain u.
Conceptually, one can view an IP as an iterative interplay between u and the net-
work who acts as a sort of “opponent”. Progressing from iteration i ≥ 0 to i + 1 the
network changes by (i) “attaching” a subgraph Fi; this may bring more vertices and
edges to Gi; and (ii) adding an edge between u and all vertices in Si. The sequence
of edges F1, F2, . . . is called the evolution trace and the sequence of sets S1, S2, . . . is
called the newcomer strategy of I. The IP is uniquely determined by the initial network
G0, actions of the network (in the form of an evolution trace) and the actions of u (in
the form of a newcomer strategy). The definition of a dynamic network means that an
IP must satisfy a locally-finiteness (LF) condition:
(LF) Any agent (including u) eventually stops adding new edges, i.e., ∀v ∈ VI ∃rv ∈
N ∀r′≥rv : v does not appear in the network Fr′ ⊕ (Sr′ ⊗ u).
3 Information Broker in a Dynamic Network
A question arises as to how the newcomer may choose its strategy during an IP to get
into the network center.
Definition 3. An IP I = G0, G1, . . . is a broker scheme of u if u ∈ C(Gr) for some
r ∈ N.
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We are interested in tactics that construct a broker scheme regardless of the evolution
trace. Here, our attention is on a type of strategies where u makes decisions about Si
at each timestamp given only the current network instance Gi.
Definition 4. A tactic of u is a function τ defined on the set of all networks such
that τ(G) ⊆ V for any G = (V,E) and ∀v ∈ V : uv ∈ E ⇒ v /∈ τ(G). An IP
I = G0, G1, . . . is said to be consistent with τ if its newcomer strategy S1, S2, . . .
satisfies that ∀i > 0: Si = τ(Gi−1); we use IP(τ) to denote the class of all IPs
consistent with τ .
We generalize information brokerage to the dynamic context.
Definition 5. Let P be a collection of IPs. A broker tactic for P is a tactic β such that
P ∩ IP(β) 6= ∅ and any I ∈ P ∩ IP(β) is a broker scheme.
The rest of the section studies the existence of broker tactics.
Definition 6. Fix numbers k > 0 and ` ≥ 0. An IP I is (k, `)-confined if Fi of the
evolution trace F1, . . . contains at most ` and any |Si| ≤ k for all i ≥ 1.
(k, 0)-confined IP is static where broker tactics always exist.
Theorem 1. For any k > 1, there exists a broker tactic of u for the class of (k, 1)-
confined IPs.
Proof. Define the tactic τ of u as follows: Let τ(G) be an arbitrary set of k vertices
in G not adjacent to u (or the set of all vertices not adjacent to u if more than k such
vertices exist). We claim that any IP I = G0, G1, . . . consistent with τ is a broker
scheme of u. Since k > 1, for any timestamp s > t = (k − 1)|V0|, the network
instance Gs contains at most one vertex not-linked to u. Moreover, if u is linked to all
other vertices in Gs, eccGs(u) = 1 < rad(Gs) and then I is a broker scheme.
Now suppose that for all s > t, the evolution process adds a new vertex, say xs and
an edge xsys where ys ∈ Vs−1. Then there must be a timestamp s > t, such that ys =
xs′ for some t < s′ < s, as otherwise some vertex in Gt will have an infinite degree.
In the instance Gs, the furthest vertex from u is xs with distGs(u, xs) = 2 and hence
eccGs(u) = 2. Clearly, ys is not connected to all vertices in Vs and thus rad(Gs) = 2.
Therefore at this timestamp, u ∈ C(Gs), and the IP is a broker scheme.
Theorem 2. No broker tactic exists for the set of (k, `)-confined IPs when `≥2.
Proof. Take a tactic τ of u. Inductively construct (k, `)-confined IP G0, G1, . . . in
IP(τ) where u /∈ C(Gi) for any i ≥ 0: Suppose u /∈C(Gi) at instance Gi=(Vi, Ei).
Consider the graph H =Gi ⊕ (τ(Gi) ⊗ u). If u is not adjacent to any vertex in H ,
then clearly u will not reach the center of Gi+1 regardless of Fi+1. Otherwise, take
v ∈ Vi that is the furthest from u. Let r = distH(u, v). Let P = v, x1, . . . , x` be a
simple path attaches to v at one end, x1, . . . , x` do not belong to Vi, and the edges are
{vx1, x1x2, . . . , x`−1x`}. Now set Gi+1 = Gi ⊕ (P ⊕ (τ(Gi)⊗ u)) = H ⊕ P .
Clearly, eccGi+1(u) = r + ` as the furthest vertex from u is x`. Now pick
a path between u and v, and let w be the vertex along this path that is adjacent
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to u; distGi+1(w, x`) = r + ` − 1, and for all other vertices y, distGi+1(w, y) ≤
distGi+1(u, y)+ 1 ≤ r+1. As ` ≥ 2, eccGi+1(w) ≤ r+1 < eccGi+1(u). This means
that u /∈ C(Gi+1).
One can view (k, `) as specification of an IP protocol: When k > 1 = `, the new-
comer u gains an upper hand to reach the center; If, on the other hand, ` > 2, u may
never “catch up” with the rest of the network. The only case left is when k=`=1, and
we will focus on this case in our experiments.
To further investigate the existence of a broker tactic, we look closely at the proof
of Thm. 1. The non-existence of a broker tactic is due to the fact that the center “shifts”
as new vertices are added. This may not be the case in real-life, e.g., a core/periphery
structure contains a highly stable network core meaning that the network center would
be relatively stable [8, 24].
Definition 7. Let G = G0, G1, . . . be a dynamic network. We say that G has a
bounded center if there exists a vertex c ∈ VG, and d ∈ N such that ∀i ≥ 0∀v ∈
C(Gi) : distGi(v, c) ≤ d.
Bounded center property means that the center of the dynamic network would not
expand or shift indefinitely. The following fact easily follows from (LF).
Lemma 1. G is a dynamic network with a bounded center if and only if the set C =⋃
i∈N C(Gi) is a finite set.
Proof. Suppose C is finite. Pick any c ∈ C and set d as lim supi∈Nmaxv∈C(Gi) distGi(c, v);
d must be in N as C is finite. Therefore ∀i≥0: C(Gi)⊆{v ∈ VG | distGi(v, c)≤d}.
Conversely, suppose G has a bounded center. Then C is a subset of the union
D0∪D1∪· · ·∪Dd where eachDi = {v ∈ VG | ∃j ∈ N : distGj (v, c) = i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ d.
Clearly, D0 = {c}. Suppose Di is a finite set, by (LF),
⋃
v∈Di{w | vw ∈ Ej , j ∈ N}
is also finite. Therefore, Di+1 is also finite, and hence
⋃
i∈N C(Gi) is finite.
Theorem 3. There exists a broker tactic for the class of all (1, `)-confined IPs with a
bounded center.
Proof. Define tactic τ by τ(G) = {v} where ∃w ∈ C(G) : distG(v, w) ≤ 1 and
uv /∈ E if such a vertex exists; τ(G) = ∅ otherwise. To show that there is some
I ∈ IP(τ) that has a bounded center, simply take G0 = ({x0, v, y0}, {x0v, vy0}) and
evolution trace F1, F2, . . . where the edges in each Fi are yiyi−1, xi−1xi, i > 0. The
corresponding IP I ∈ IP(τ) will set Gi = Gi−1 ⊕ (Fi ⊕ τ(Gi−1). Clearly C(Gi) =
{u, v} after timestamp 3 when all edges uv, ux0, uy0 are added, and τ(Gi) = ∅ for
all i > 3.
Take an IP I ∈ IP(τ) with a bounded center. By Lem. 1, C = ⋃i∈N C(Gi) is finite.
By (LF), the set C′ = ⋃i∈N{w ∈ VI | distGi(w, v) ≤ 1, v ∈ C} is also finite. Thus
for some timestamp t, all edges uv where v ∈ C′ would have been added to Gt. At this
timestamp, u belongs to C(G) and the IP is a broker scheme.
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4 Cost-Effective Tactics and Evaluations
As shown empirically below, real networks usually have bounded centers, but the tactic
in the proof of Thm. 3 is unpractical as it may create arbitrarily many edges. To fix a
framework where tactics are comparable, from now on, we focus on tactics τ that add
a single edge in a timestamp (i.e., |τ(G)|=1) until u enters C(G). By the cost of an
IP, we mean the number of timestamps elapsed before u enters the center (infinite if
u never enters the center). We are interested in cost-effective tactics that result in the
least expected cost.
Uset-based tactics. Over static networks, our problem reduces to finding a minimum
broker set. The problem is shown to be NP-complete by [21] who also gave several
cost-effective tactics. At any timestamp i of I=G0, G1, . . ., the uncovered set (Uset)
Ui is {v ∈ Vi | distGi(u, v) > rad(Gi)}. Two tactics, named SMax and SBtw resp.,
add an edge from u to a vertex v ∈ Uu,i that has maximum degree (as in SMax) or
betweenness (as in SBtw) centrality. Over static networks, their tactics build a sub-
radius dominating set which corresponds to a broker set and is normally small, e.g.,
SMax finds a broker set of size 4 on a (static) collaboration network with > 8600
vertices.
Rset-based tactics. A downside, however, lies with the Uset-based tactics over core/periphery
structures: Once a link is created from u to someone in the core, these tactics would
forbid further links with those that are also in the core (as they are “covered”). As a
result, they result in suboptimal solutions. We thus modify the method by allowing u
to link with some vertices in the Uset, as long as they are close to uncovered vertices.
More formally, we define a remote-center set (Rset) at timestamp i of I=G0, G1, . . .
asRi={v∈V | distGi(x, v)> rad(Gi)}, where x is a furthest vertex from u. We intro-
duce RMax and RBtw as tactics that, instead of choosing vertices from Ui at timestamp
i, links u with a v in the Rset Ri that has the largest degree (in RMax) or maximum
betweenness (in RBtw) centrality. To contrast these tactics, Fig. 1 shows an example
where SMax gave suboptimal solutions for both static/dynamic case; SBtw gave an
optimal solution for static but not for the dynamic case; and RMax/RBtw gave optimal
solutions for both cases.
MUF. Another tactic for u is to link with neighbors of a center vertex c, thus getting
into the center. To minimize cost, c is chosen to have the least degree in C(G). A
heuristic then selects from the most useful friends (MUF) of c, which are defined as
neighbors of c that are at distance rad(G) − 1 from the furthest vertex from u. Alg.1
implements this tactic for one timestamp (when u /∈ C(G)). This tactic will work in
dynamic networks whose center does not change much.
We run and evaluate the tactics on 4 real-world datasets.
Datasets. The number of timestamps in these networks ranges from 50 to ∼ 60000.
CollegeMsg network (Msg) is a timestamped online social network at the University
of California, Irvine [23]; An edge jk denotes a message sent between j and k.
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Figure 1: Contrasting RMax/RBtw with SMax/SBtw. G0 contains {1, . . . , 10} and (solid)
edges among them. The edges {9, 11}, {6, 12}, {8, 13} (dash) are added one at a time in three
timestamps. TreatingG0 as static, SMax and SBtw link u to {2, 6, 7} and {3, 8} (optimal), resp.
For the dynamic network, both SMax and SBtw create three edges in 3 timestamps (SMax links
to 2, 6, 7, SBtw links to 2, 5, 12), while RMax and RBtw links to 2, 3 in 2 timestamps.
Algorithm 1 Most-Useful-Friends (MUF) tactic
INPUT A graph G = (V,E), newcomer u
c← argminv∈C(G) deg(v). . center with min degree
If u is isolated, return v adjacent to c with max degree.
x← argmaxi∈V distG(i, u)
F ← {v ∈ V | vc ∈ E, distG(v, x) = rad(G)− 1}
Return v∈F not adjacent to u with max degree.
Bitcoin OTC trust network (Bitcoin) record anonymous Bitcoin trading on Bitcoin
OTC with temporal information [18]. An edge jk denotes a trade between j and
k.
Cit-HepPh network (Cit) is a high-energy physics citation network [19], which col-
lects all papers from 1992 to 1998 on arXiv; An (undirected) edge jk denotes
that paper j cites paper k.
Trade network (Trade) denotes yearly world trade partnership, 1951 – 2009 [15];
Edges represent trade partnership which is defined based on import/export be-
tween two countries.
All networks above, apart from Trade, has only additive changes to the network. Ta-
ble 1 shows multiple statistics of the last networks instance. The goodness of fit shows
how well nodal degrees align with a power-law distribution, indicating a clear scale-
free property. clus-coef and diam show that the networks have high clustering co-
efficient and low diameter, indicating small-world property. Cp-coef is a metrics for
core-periphery structure; a positive value indicates a clear core/periphery structure [12].
Fig. 2 analyzes temporal properties of the networks. It is clearly seen that, despite the
continuous expansion of the network (in size), the graph center gains little in terms of
diameter. Moreover, the location of the center does not shift as the maximum distance
between a fixed vertex v and vertices in the center stay bounded by a small distance
during all timestamps.
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Trade Msg Bitcoin Cit
|V | 176 1899 5875 14083
|E| 1229 20296 21489 104211
clust-coef 0.54 0.10 0.17 0.26
max.deg 113 255 795 266
diam 4 8 9 15
center size 118 1 16 61
timestamps 50 59835 35592 2000
goodness of fit 0.74 0.89 0.86 0.91
cp-coef 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.14
Table 1: Statistics of Real-world Networks (Last Timestamp)
Experiment 1 (Cost). The goal is to compare the tactics treating SMax/SBtw as
benchmarks. For each dataset, we choose 28(Msg), 36(Bitcoin), 18(Cit), and 8(Trade)
timestamps as an initial network from which IP are simulated. We also tune the interval
between two consecutive timestamps where the newcomer u adds an edge; See Fig. 3
for results of tactics: RMax,RBtw, MUF significantly outperform the benchmarks in
all cases, obtaining costs generally below 10. They are robust in the sense that the
costs vary little when starting from different initial network, while costs of SMax/SBtw
dramatically increase as initial timestamp changes. To visually compare the tactics,
Fig. 4 illustrates the result of SMax/RMax/MUF after running on an instance of Bitcoin
with 2200 initial vertices, stopping when u enters the center. SMax apparently incurs
higher cost building more edges than the other two tactics. It is also apparent that SMax
connects largely to peripheral vertices, while MUF positions u well into the center.
5 Dynamic Center/Periphery Models
To analyze factors attributing to tactic performance, we run dynamic network models
of center/periphery structures.
Dynamic BA model. This well-established dynamic model takes a parameter d ∈ N
and adds a new vertex at each timestamp who randomly links with d vertices by a
preferential attachment mechanism. Over multiple iterations, the graph develops a
scale-free property, however, it fails to achieve a highly-clustered core.
Dynamic JR model. The model proposed by [16] simulates stochastic friendship
making among an agent population. An agent may link with a friend-of-friends or a
random individual. At each timestamp, the model randomly samples for every vertex v
a set S1(v) of m non-adjacent vertices from the entire network, and another set S2(v)
of m vertices who are at distance 2 from v (S1(v) and S2(v) may not be disjoint).
It then builds edges between v and every vertex in S1(v) ∪ S2(v) with probability p.
As argued in [16], the model meets most of the desired properties such as scale-free
and small-world properties. The value m ≈ d/4p relies on p and an expected average
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Figure 2: Temporal properties of real-world networks. The horizontal axis is timestamps. size is
the number of vertices in the network; Gdiam and Cdiam are resp. the diameter of the network
and of the center. dist-v is the maximum distance from any vertex C(G) to a fixed vertex v.
Figure 3: (Top left) Msg has 28 initial timestamps and interval 50; (top right) Bitcoin has 36
initial timestamps and interval 10; (bottom left) Cit with 18 initial timestamps and interval 1;
(bottom right) Trade has 8 initial timestamps and interval 1. The vertical axis indicates the cost
of IP.
10
Figure 4: Result of SMax, RMax and MUF over Bitcoin starting from 2200 vertices until u (star)
enters the center; red lines are edges built by the tactics.
degree d ∈ N which are parameters of the model. We pick p = {0.25, 0.5, 1} to
resemble the fitted values on the real-world networks in [16].
Dynamic rich-club. Rich-club has been a “go-to” model of a core/periphery structure
which develops a dense, central core with a sparse periphery [5, 8]. At each timestamp,
the process adds a new vertex with probability α ∈ [0, 1] (and links it with a random
vertex) or a link between two existing vertices with probability 1−α. If the latter case,
it chooses a random source w ∈ V and links it with a target z as follows: For every
k ∈ N, set [k] = {v ∈ V | deg(v) = k}; The probability that z ∈ [k] is ∝ k[k]. The
probability α, computed by α=2(N + 1)/(Nd+2), depends on the targeted average
degree d and graph size N , which are parameters in the model.
Dynamic onion. An onion is a core/periphery structure, but unlike in a rich-club,
peripheral vertices here are connected to form one or several layers surrounding the
core, resembling highly resilient networks, e.g., criminal rings [8]. The original static
onion model generates a network with a fixed a power-law degree distribution q(k)∼
k−γ (where γ ∈ R depends on the average degree d). We dynamize this model so
that vertices are iteratively added, loosely speaking: At each timestamp, we (1) add a
new vertex v whose degree deg(v)=k with probability q(k); (2) To add v to G while
preserving the degree distribution, create a pool of “studs” (i.e., half-edges) initially
containing k studs attached to v; (3) randomly severe k existing edges into 2k studs
which are added to L; (4) repeatedly “join” random pairs of studs v, w in L to form
edge vw with probability pvw=(1+3|sv−sw|)−1, taking care to avoid self-loops and
duplicates, until L = ∅ [27].
Table 2 summarizes key statistics of the models minding that they share the same
parameter – average degree d ∈ N. Here we set d = 6 to resemble values in empirical
data sets1, the network size 500 and the initial network being a cycle graph with length
10, as for BA model in [1]. For the JR model, a column is created for each value
of p ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1}. The rich-club and onion models have exceptionally high CP
180 datasets on KONECT and SNAP have average degree between 2 and 10 http://konect.uni-koblenz.
de/, http://snap.stanford.edu/
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BA JR0.25 JR0.5 JR1 rich-club onion
clustering 0.04 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.04 0.21
max deg 53.4 31.6 32.9 27.18 46.44 118
center size 120.5 33.0 47.1 19.18 27.16 3
diameter 5.6 8.3 7.84 6.54 9.46 7.4
radius 4 5 4.7 4.08 5.2 4.18
cp-coef -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.26
Table 2: Key Statistics of the Models with d = 6 and N = 500
Figure 5: Illustrations of the four dynamic network models. Nodes are colored by eccentricity
from lowest (blue) to highest (red).
coefficient showing a clear core/periphery structure. Fig. 5 visually contrasts the four
models clearly displaying the core in rich-club and onion, while for BA and JR the
center is not clear.
Experiment 2. We run all tactics treating SMax & SBtw as benchmarks over syn-
thetic dynamic networks. IPs are simulated using the models above; the initial network
is generated by the corresponding model and has size 500. There are several parame-
ters which we may adjust. The first is the average degree d which corresponds to the
speed of adding edges to the network at each timestamp. The second is the growth rate
` of the network, which is the number of vertices that can be added in each timestamp.
Firstly, we take d = 2, . . . , 10 and fix ` = 1; the costs of all tactics are plotted in Fig. 6.
Then, we fix d = 6 and adjust ` from 10 to 500; the costs are plotted in Fig. 7 (so that
the resulting IP is (1, `)-confined). All values in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are averaged among
100 trials.
We make several discussions: • Apparent from the plots, RMax, RBtw and MUF
places u into the center with much less costs compared to the benchmarks; The cost
of these tactics is also very stable where the cost remains below 10 for every model
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Figure 6: Costs of tactics performed on each model with varying average degree.
even when d = 14 or ` = 500. Recall from Thm. 2 that when the network expands
more rapidly, potentially no broker tactic would exist leading to an infinite cost; our
experiment show that this would not happen for the four models of dynamic networks.
• The gap in cost between RMax/RBtw/MUF and SMax/SBtw gets very wide (5 - 8
times) for models with a high CP-coefficient (rich-club, onion). This may be due to
dense ties among core members resulting in them being excluded by SMax/SBtw.
• Tactics have relatively similar performance over BA and JR-1 networks; This
may be due to the lack of a tight-knit core in these two models.
• A faster growth rate ` (with a fixed d) would not affect the costs of tactics as the
tactics exploit the central vertices which are relatively stable regardless of `.
• The vertices with high betweenness tend to locate around the center, so tactics
with maximum betweenness have better performance on high CP-coefficient net-
works.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We develop a structural investigation into the process where a newcomer integrates
into a dynamic network through building ties. Our conclusions concern with condi-
tions that warrant the existence of a broker tactic and simple cost-effective tactics over
center/periphery networks. Five tactics are extensively compared on four real world
datasets and four dynamic network models.
Modeling network dynamics has posed many challenges and we hope this work
addresses some of them by providing a new angle and further insights. Many future
work remain: (1) It is a natural question to explore dynamic models where ties are
added as well as severed. (2) A distinction exists between the notions of network
13
Figure 7: Costs of tactics performed on each model with varying growth rate.
core and center [2]; A future question would be to investigate tactics that place the
newcomer into the core, rather than just the network center. (3) Community structure
is another prevalent meso-scale property and the same question could be targeted at
dynamic community structure models. (4) Moving from the tactics of a single agent to
a population of agents, one may formulate and investigate game-theoretical models of
network formation based on the notions of social capital.
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